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to be sold is an intoxicating beverage, the sale of which requires 
a license under the law. :B'urthermore, it cannot be said that 
wine for this purpose could not be conveniently obtained else-
where. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, ,J., Traynor, J., Achauer, 
,J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied May 21, 
1953. 
[L. A. No. 22045. In Bank. Apr. 29, 1953.] 
TLSFJ LAHN WEITZENKORN, Appellant, v. SOL LESSEg 
et al., Respondents. 
[la, lb] Literary Property-Pleading.-A count of a complaint 
which alleges that plaintiff wrote and was exclusive owner 
of a literary composition, that she had submitted it to de-
fendants at their special request "pursuant to an express oral 
understanding and agreement" that, in consideration of such 
submission, she would be paid the reasonable value thereof 
and given the eustomary screen credit as author if they should 
use all or any part of it, that defendants accepted submission 
of the document and retained it in their possession for sev-
eral months, and that thereafter they produced and exhibited 
a motion picture which was patterned on, copied and used 
plaintiff's composition to her damage, states a cause of action, 
and a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining 
a demurrer thereto without leave to amend will be reversed 
with directions to permit defendants to answer. 
[2a, 2b] ld.-Pleading.-A count of a complaint which alleges that 
plaintiffs furnished to defendants, at their special instance and 
request, her literary composition for the purpose of sale to 
defendants on payment to her of a reasonable value thereof, 
and that defendants accepted such literary composition, re-
tained and used it to her damage, states a cause of action, 
and a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining a 
demurrer thereto without leave to amend will be reversed with 
directions to permit defendants to answer. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Literary Property; Am.Jur., Literary Prop-
erty and Copyright, § 112. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Literary Property. 
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[3a-3c] Id.-Pleading.-A count of a complaint which alleges 
that plaintiff submitted her literary composition to defend-
ants with the understanding that she would be paid the rea-
sonable value thereof if they should use all or any part of 
it, and that without her knowledge, authority or consent, they 
embodied her composition in a motion picture, substantially 
copying and misappropriating it, does not state a cause of 
action where there is no similarity as to protectible portions of 
plaintiff's composition, and a judgment of dismissal following 
an order sustaining a demurrer thereto without leave to amend 
will be affirmed. 
APPEAr~ from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Byron ,J. \:Valters, Judge pro tem.~' Af-
firmed in part and reversed in part with directions. 
Action for damages for unlawful use of literary property. 
Judgment of dismissal following order sustaining demurrers 
to complaint without leave to amend affirmed as to one cause 
of action and reversed as to two other causes of action with 
directions to permit defendants to answer. 
F'emller, ·weber & Lerner, Harold A. F'endler, Daniel A. 
·weber and Robert \V. Lerner for Appellant. 
Aubrey I. Finn, Pacht, Tannenbaum & Ross, Clore Warne, 
Gordon Stulberg and Maxwell E. Greenberg as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Appellant. 
Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp and Arthur Groman for 
Hespondents. 
Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges, Loeb & Loeb, Herman 
F'. Selvin and Harry L. Gershon as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-Ilse Lahn Weitzenkorn has sued Sol Lesser, 
Sol Lesser Productions, Inc., and HKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 
charg·ing that they have unlawfully used literary property 
of which she is the owner. Her appeal is from a judgment of 
dismissal which followed an order sustaining the demurrers 
of the defendants without leave to amend. 
[la] In the first cause of action, against Lesser and Lesser 
Productions only, vVeitzenkorn alleges that she originated, 
created and wrote a literary composition entitled, ''Tarzan 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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in the Land of Eternal Youth,'' of which she is the exclusive 
owner. A copy of the composition is attached to the com-
plaint. This composition was submitted to Lesser and the 
corporation at their special request; ''pursuant to an express 
oral understanding and agreement'' that, in consideration of 
such submission, she would be paid the reasonable value thereof 
and given the customary screen credit as author if they should 
use all or any part of it. Lesser and Lesser Productions 
accepted submission of the document, she states, retained it 
in their possession for several months, and ''became fully 
familiar with the contents.'' 
Thereafter according to the complaint, Lesser and Lesser 
Productions produced a motion picture, entitled "Tarzan's 
Magic Fountain,'' which they distributed and exhibited in 
conjunction with RKO Pictures. This motion picture, W eit-
zenkorn alleges, "is patterned upon and copies and uses" her 
composition. By reason of its nature and bulk, and because 
it is in the possession of the defendants, a copy of the motion 
picture film is not attached to the complaint. Damages of 
$50,000 are claimed as the reasonable value of her composition, 
and the same amount for the reasonable value of the screen 
credit which she did not receive. 
[2a] The second count, also against Lesser and Lesser Pro-
ductions only, incorporates by reference all of the allegations of 
the first except the averments with respect to an express agree-
ment. In addition, it alleges that vVeitzenkorn submitted the 
composition to Lesser and Lesser Productions at their request 
for the purpose of sale to, or use by, them, upon payment to 
her of its reasonable value. 
[3a] The third count, against all of the defendants, incor-
porates by reference the material allegations of the first, with 
the exception of those relating to an express agreement and 
damages. W eitzenkorn then alleges that, without her knowl-
edge, authority or consent, the defendants produced and dis-
tributed ''Tarzan's Magic Fountain,'' substantially copying 
and misappropriating her composition. General damages of 
$100,000 are alleged to have been sustained. 
Lesser and Lesser Productions demurred to the complaint 
upon the grounds that each count fails to state facts sufficient 
to constitute a cause of action and that, in certain particulars, 
each of them is ambiguous, unintellig·ible or uncertain. RKO 
demurred to the third count upon the same grounds. At the 
request of the defendants, pursuant to section 426 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, the court made an order for a viewing 
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of the motion picture prior to and in connection with its ruling 
on the demurrers. The order also directed "that the contents 
of such production be deemed a part of the complaint to the 
same extent and with the same foree as though such production 
had been attached to the complaint." 
'l'he composition or synopsis which is the basis of the contro-
versy may be summarized as follows: 
Tarzan, Jane, Boy and Cheta are interrupted by the arrival 
of an airplane "breaking the peace of their jungle idyl." The 
visitors are Jane's British cousin, Peter Selton, and his man-
servant, Gus. Peter is an "aging dandy." Gus provides 
comic relief, aided and abetted by the monkey, Cheta. Tarzan 
is not too happy to have guests; the travelers appear to be 
prepared for an indefinite stay. 
Peter is "rather cagey about the reason" for his visit and 
Tarzan ''senses there is more to Peter's expedition'' than 
Peter is willing to reveal. Peter flies about the countryside 
seeking, and eventually finding, the Fountain of Youth located 
in the "Land Between Dusk and Sunrise," of which he has 
a map. Boy, without Tarzan's permission, accompanies Peter 
and Gus on the day they fly to the mysterious land. The 
three are captured by warriors of the beautiful but cruel 
Queen Lilith who rules the land of eternal youth. Queen 
Lilith offers them the choice of eternal youth or death. No 
one can leave her land. 
Tarzan, meanwhile, worried by the absence of Boy, sets 
off with Jane and Cheta to rescue him. Tarzan and Jane 
themselves are captured by Lilith's warriors. Tarzan escapes 
with Jane and Boy and, after getting them to safety, attempts 
to free Peter and Gus. In the ensuing battle, Peter dies a 
hero. Tarzan destroys the land and its inhabitants by throw-
ing a flame into the fountain of youth. The queen and her 
subjects wither into extreme old age, shrink, disintegrate and 
vanish. 
The motion picture has been viewed by the Justices of this 
court. It also features Tarzan, Jane and Cheta, but has no 
character corresponding to Boy. Tarzan freely enters and 
leaves Blue Valley, the land of eternal youth. The kindly 
king of the land is his friend. Tarzan's first visit is upon a 
mission of mercy. He is seeking Gloria James, an aviatrix 
missing for 20 years, whose testimony is needed to free a man 
from prison. Gloria leaves the valley with Tarzan, goes to 
England and marries. Having aged rapidly after leaving the 
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Yalley, she comes back to Africa with her husband to seek 
Tarzan's help in returning to the land of eternal youth. 
Tarzan refuses Gloria's request, but in his absence Jane 
offers to lead them to Blue Valley. Tarzan follows the party 
to teach Jane a lesson, rescues them from a flood, and secretly 
conveys Gloria and her husband to the land of eternal youth, 
leaving Jane to return home. The king of the valley permits 
Tarzan to leave in friendship, but rebel warriors capture and 
attempt to blind him. 
Tarzan escapes to discover Jane in peril. Dodd and Trask, 
the villains of the picture who are seeking the land of eternal 
youth for profit, have forced Jane to show them the way. 
Tarzan rescues J·ane. Dodd and Trask die at the hands of 
valley g·uards. 
\Veitzenkorn contends that her complaint tenders issues of 
fact with respect to originality, similarity and copying which 
require a trial on the merits. These issues, she says, should not 
have been determined on demurrer as questions of law. In 
addition, she argues that the first and second counts, based 
upon express and implied contracts, tender issues of fact as 
to whether Lesser and Lesser Productions promised to pay 
for the use of her compositiou regardless of whether it was 
original. 
It is also argued that section 426 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, as amended in 194 7, does not authorize the deter-
mination upon demurrer of factual issues such as originality, 
similarity, aecess and copying. The section is said to apply 
only to ''infringement'' eases, not to those concerning breach 
of express or implied contract. 
The defendants take the position that section 426 was 
amended to create a statutory method for determining upon 
demurrer whether a complaint for plagiarism and related 
contract theories states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of 
action. Originality and similarity, they say, are questions of 
law to be determined by the court in the first instance. Upon 
the issue of originality, they contend, the court should apply 
the doctrine of judicial notice. 
Section 426 ( 3), Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in 
194 7, in part provides: "If the demand be for relief on ac-
count of the alleged infringement of the plaintiff's rights in 
and to a literary, artistic or intellectual production, there must 
be attached to the complaint a copy of the production as to 
which the infringement is claimed and a copy of the alleged 
infringing produetion. If, by reason of bulk or the nature 
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of the production, it is not practicable to attach a copy to the 
complaint, that fact and the reasons why it is impracticable 
to attach a copy of the production to the complaint shall be 
alleged; and the court, in connection with any demurrer, 
motion or other proceeding in the cause in which a knowledge 
of the contents of such production may be necessary or desir-
able, shall make such order for a view of the production not 
attached as will suit the convenience of the court, to the end 
that the contents of such production may be deemed to be a 
part of the complaint to the same extent and with the same 
force as though such production had been capable of being 
and had been attached to the complaint.'' 
The effective date of the statute was subsequent to the filing 
of the complaints in Stanley v. Col7tmbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc., 35 Ca1.2d 653 [221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 2161, and 
Gold7:ng v. R.K.O. P1:ctures, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690 [221 P.2d 95]. 
The question as to the effect of the enactment here arises for 
the first time. 
\Veitzenkorn asserts that the code section is not applicable 
to her first and second causes of action. As she construes the 
statute, it is limited to the tort action for "infringement." 
The defendants claim its benefits as to both the tort action 
and related contract actions. 
The statute is similar to rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules 
for Practice and Procedure under section 101 of the Copy-
right Act. (17 U.S.C.A., following § 101, formerly § 25.) 
That rule provides in part: ''A copy of the alleged infringe-
ment of copyright, if actually made, and a copy of the work 
alleged to be infringed, should accompany the petition, or its 
absence be explained; . . . '' Form 17 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure also provides for attachment of infringed 
and infringing compositions to a complaint for infringement 
of copyright. (Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., form 17, 28 U.S.C.A.) 
The federal courts consistently have held that failure to 
attach copies of the infringed and infringing compositions, or 
to explain such failure, renders a complaint for infringement 
of copyright defective. (Buck v. L1:ederkranz, 34 F.Supp. 
1006, 1007; Cole v. Allen, 3 F.R.D. 236, 237.) However, rule 
2 makes no provision for the court to order a view of the pro-
duction if physical attachment is not feasible. There is also 
an essential difference in language between rule 2 and our 
statute. Rule 2 is limited to ''infringement of copyright''; 
section 426 (3) extends to "infringement of ... rights in and 
to a literary, artistic or intellectual production.'' Thus, rule 
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2 clearly applies only to a cause of action for infringement 
of copyright, and its provisions are not applicable to a cause 
of action based upon breach of contract or quasi contract. 
W eitzenkorn argues that, without exception, the word "in-
fringement'' has been defined by the state and federal courts 
as referring to a tort. The statute, she says, cannot be con-
strued as applying ''infringement'' to an action for breach 
of express or implied contract or for quasi contract. She re-
lies upon the rule that: ''When the scope and meaning of words 
or phrases in a statute have been repeatedly interpreted by 
the courts, there is some indication that the use of them in 
a subsequent statute in a similar setting carries with it a 
like construction." (Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal.2d 87, 93 [207 
P.2d 47] ; City of Long Beach v. Payne, 3 Cal.2d 184, 191 
[44 P.2d 305].) 
However, the courts have not defined the word "infringe-
ment," standing by itself, as referring only to a tort. Rather, 
the definition consistently has been that the phrase "infringe-
ment of copyright" connotes a tort. (Frankel v. Irwin, 34 
F.2d 142, 143; McCaleb v. Fox Film Corp., 299 F. 48, 50.) 
In like manner, an action to recover damages arising out of 
alleged plagiarism has been classified as a tort action (ltaliani 
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Corp., 45 Cal.App.2d 464, 466-467 
[114 P.2d 370]) and the defendant in such an action referred 
to as a tort feasor. (Barsha. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 32 Cal. 
App.2d 556, 559 [90 P.2d 371] .) 
Although the word "infringement" is most commonly ap-
plied to actions for unlawful appropriation of copyright, 
trademark, or patent (see, generally, 21 W. & Ph. 315 et seq., 
''Infringe ; Infringement''), its usage is not limited solely to 
such actions. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th edition, page 920, 
defines ''infringement'' as : ''A breaking into ; a trespass or 
encroachment upon; a violation of a law, regulation, contract, 
or right. Used especially of invasions of the rights secured 
by patents, copyrights, and trademarks.'' This definition of 
infringement as applying to both tortious and contractual 
wrongs is in accord with the definitions in Webster's New In-
ternational Dictionary, second edition. "Infringe" is there de-
fined: "To commit a breach of; to violate; to neglect to ful-
fill or obey; to commit an infringement of; as, to infringe a 
law, contract, or patent." Webster's definition of "infringe-
ment" is: "1. Act of infringing; esp., breach; violation; non-
fulfillment; as, the infringement of a treaty, compact, law or 
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constitution. 2. An encroachment or trespass on a right or 
privilege; a trespass; . . . " 
It is clear, therefore, that the word ''infringement'' has no 
technical meaning when disassociated from the phrase "in-
fringement of copyright (patent, trademark)." Thus, an 
action based upon infringement, or breach, of contract would 
fall within the terms of a statute relating to infringement of 
rights which may be contractual. Only where the statute re-
fers to a term of art such as "infringement of copyright" 
would the action for breach of contract be excluded from its 
operation. 
The Legislature has not limited section 426(3) to "infringe-
ment of copyright'' alone, but has included within its opera-
tion infringement of any ''rights in and to a literary, artistic 
or intellectual production.'' These rights may be entirely con-
tractual, as in Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc ... 
supra, where there was no copyright. Construed in accord-
ance with these definitions, the statute applies not only to the 
third alleged cause of action for infringement of copyright, but 
also to the first and second causes of action for infringement of 
related contract rights. Accordingly, the order of the superior 
court making the motion picture a part of the complaint af-
fects all three alleged causes of action. 
Concerning the scope of the code section, W eitzenkorn con-
tends that all of the issues presented are questions of fact 
which cannot be decided upon demurrer. She argues that the 
statute cannot deprive her of her right to a trial by jury. The 
only purpose of the statute, she says, is to proteet the de-
fendant in such an action from an attempt to prove a fraudu-
lent claim by presenting upon the trial a production created 
after the action was commenced. 
The statute is neither so limited as she contends, nor so 
broad as to destroy the right to a jury trial. The Legislature 
has required that the allegeil infringed and infringing produc-
tions be marlr a pRrt of the complaint. If this he impracticable, 
hy a different procedure they are a part of the pleading to 
the same extent as if they had been attached to it. 
W eitzenkorn correctly argues that the well pleaded facts 
of her complaint must be taken as true for the purposes of 
demurrer. However, the facts pleaded include the produc-
tions incorporated in accordance with the statute. ''The gen-
eral rule is that when a written instrument which is the founda-
tion of a cause of action or defense is attached to a pleading 
as an exhibit and incorporated into it by proper reference, 
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the court may, upon demurrer, examine the exhibit and treat 
the pleader's allegations of its legal effect as surplusage.'' 
(Washer v. Bank of America, 21 Cal.2d 822, 829-830 
[136 P.2d 297, 155 A.L.R. 1338] ; Gosewisch v. Doran, 161 
Cal. 511, 515-516 [119 P. 656, Ann.Cas. 1913D 442]; Ventura 
etc. Ry. Co. v. Hartman, 116 Cal. 260,263 [48 P. 65].) The 
same rule is as applicable to an action for the taking of literary 
property as to other types of actions to which it has been ap-
plied. (Shipman v. R.ILO. Radio Pictures, Inc., 20 F.Supp. 
249, affd. 100 F.2d 533; Lowenfels v. Nathan, 2 F.Supp. 73, 
74.) 
The vital question, therefore, is: What matters properly 
are brought within the scope of the inquiry by these de-
murrers? W eitzenkorn argues that the issues concerning 
originality, similarity and copying are questions of fact which 
cannot be determined upon demurrer. The defendants con-
tend that these are questions of law to be determined by the 
court in the first instance. The issue of access is not here in-
volved because the allegation thereof in the complaint must 
be taken as true for the purpose of ruling upon the demurrers. 
Although the precise question here is of first impression 
in this state, it has been foreshadowed by the Stanley and 
Golding cases, supra. As stated in the Golding case, ''It is, 
however, only the product of the writer's creative mind which 
is protectible. . . . The plaintiff must establish, as the sub-
ject of the cause of action, a right in the nature of property 
which is capable of ownership. . . . It is essential from the 
nature of the inquiry as to originality to first dissect the play 
to determine wherein, if at all, plaintiffs have any protectible 
property right. Assuming this is established, then comparison 
may be made between the two works as to the original and pro-
tectible portion only." (Sttpra, pp. 695, 700.) 
W eitzenkorn would limit the holding of the Golding case 
to the single proposition that only the "question as to whether 
the claimed original or novel idea has been reduced to con-
crete form is an issue of law." (P. 695.) She construes the 
decision as holding that the issues of originality, similarity, 
and copying are questions of fact only for the jury. However, 
from a reading of Golding's play, the court determined that 
there was sufficient evidence of originality to sustain the 
implied finding of the jury. Accordingly, if the production 
attached to \Veitzenkorn 's complaint shows no evidence of 
originality, she has no protectible property therein and there 
is no question to submit to the jury. 
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The Stanley case, supra, page 665, and Yadkoe v. Fields, 
66 Cal..App.2d 150, 159 ll51 P.2d 906], state that the orig-
im<Iity of the plaintiff's program is not a question of law to 
be determined by the court but is one of fact for the jury. 
Implicit in both opinions, however, is the acknowledgment 
that, in the first instance, the question of originality or novelty 
is one of law. After determining the issue of similarity in the 
Stanley case, the court stated: ''The next question to be dis-
cussed is whether or not plaintiff's idea as such was so new 
and novel as to be worthy of protection." (P. 663.) Obviously, 
without proof of originality, the judgment would not have been 
affirmerl. I .. ikewise in Y adkoe v. Fields, the court held that: 
"Sufficient evidence was presented on behalf of respondent 
for consideration by the jury of the issues raised by the plead-
ings; ... '' (Supra, p. 161.) 
The next question is what method the court may use to de-
termine the issue of originality presented by the demurrers. 
'l'he defendants urge that the court may take judicial notice 
of the contents of published books in deciding whether 
vVeitzenkorn 's claim of originality has merit. 
This would carry the doctrine of judicial notice far be-
yond its proper bounds. (Dezendorf v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Ihlrn C Mp., 99 F .2d 850, 851.) "The doctrine of judicial 
notice was adopted as a judicial short-cut to avoid necessity 
for the formal introduction of evidence in certain cases where 
there is no real need for such evidence. Before a court will 
take judicial notice of any fact, however, that fact must be a 
matter of common and general knowledge, well established and 
authoritatively settled, not doubtful or uncertain. The test 
is whether sufficient notoriety attaches to the fact to make it 
proper to assume its existence without proof.'' (Communist 
Party v. Peek, 20 Cal.2d 536, 546 [127 P.2d 889] .) "It is 
truly said that the power of judicial notice is as to matters 
claimed to be matters of general knowledge one to be used 
with caution. If there is any doubt whatever either as to the 
fact itself or as to its being a matter of common knowledge, 
evidence should be required." (Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 
345 [181 P. 223].) 
The court may take judicial notice of the fact that there 
exist in the realm of fiction certain well-known characters 
called Tarzan, Jane and Cheta who live in Africa, and that 
the myth of a fountain of eternal youth is one of the oldest 
known to man. These are facts of common and general knowl-
edge. However, common and general knowledge may not 
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be said to include the fact that, in previously published works, 
these characterf' and myth have been combined with the same 
treatme'nt and manner of expression which W eitzenkorn has 
used. Nor by judicial notice may a court find that Weitzen-
korn 's composition has been copied, as to plot or details, from 
previously published books. These are matters which are 
properly the subject of proof. 
Even though, by applying the rule of judicial notice, the 
basic characters and locale of Weitzenkorn 's composition 
might be held to be unoriginal, the combination of these 
characters and locale with other characters in a certain style 
and manner of expression cannot be held, upon demurrer, to 
lack originality as a matter of law. For these reasons, insofar 
as the question of a lack of originality may be involved in each 
eause of action, the demurrers could not have been sustained 
solely upon that ground. 
Section 980 of the Civil Code was amended materially in 
1947. .At the time the Stanley and Golding cases were com-
menced, it stated the following rule : ''The author of any 
product of the mind, whether it is an invention or a composi-
tion in letters or art, or a design, with or without delineation, 
or other graphical representation, has an exclusive ownership 
therein, and in the representation or expression thereof, which 
continues so long as the product and the representations or 
expressions thereof made by him remain in his possession.'' .As 
amended, the section read: ''The author or proprietor of any 
composition in letters or art has an exclusive ownership in 
the representation or expression thereof as against all persons 
except one who originally and independently creates the same 
or a similar composition.'' Insofar as is material to this action, 
the section is now in the same form. 
In the Stanley and Golding cases, protection was extended 
to an ''idea'' rather than to the form and manner of its ex-
pre:Ssion. The judgment in favor of Stanley was affirmed upon 
the ground that his idea was the new and novel combination 
of elements for a radio program. (P. 664.) In the Golding 
case the court, relying upon the former wording of section 
980, held that the ''product of the writer's creative mind'' 
(p. 695) is protectible and it extended that protection to his 
idea, "the basic dramatic core" (p. 697) of his play. Such 
extension of protection to an idea transcends the normal 
bounds of common law copyright (Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 
28 F.2d 529, 536, aff'd. 43 F.2d 685; .Amdur, Copyright Law 
and Practice 50, § 11; note, 23 .A.L.R.2d 244, 249) in which 
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ideas'' are free as air.'' (Fe,;aler v. MoroMo, 253 N.Y. 281, 287 
[171 N . .E. 56].) However,. in its earlier form, the statute ex-
pressly protected both the idea, the "product of the mind," 
and "the representation or expression thereof!' 
The 1947 amendment to section 980 has eliminated .the 
protection· formerly given to··'fany .Product of the mind.'' 
The statute as it now exists, and as it read at the time this 
cause of action arose, provides protection only "in the 
representation or expression" of a composition. The L{lgis-
Iature has abrogated the rule of protectibility of an idea and 
California now accepts the traditional theory of. protectible 
property under common law copyright. (38 .CalL.Rev. 3'37; 
note, 23 AL.R.2d 244, 262, n.l.) 
No problem is presented in. tliis case as to whether Weitzen-
korn 's idea. has. been reduced to concrete form, the composi-
tion for which she claims protection being attached to ·the 
complaint. Therefore; the question whether she has a pro-
tectible property interest depends upon the originality of 
form and manner of expression, the development of character-
izations and sequence of events: (Universal Pictures Oo. 'V. 
Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 Ji'.2d 354, 363; Harold Lloyd Corp., 
v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 24-27; Stephens v. Howells Sales Oo., 
16 F.2d 805, 808.) The idea alone, the bare, unde'Veloped story 
situation or theme, is not protectible. (Shipman v~ R;K.O. 
Radio Pic:t~!res, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 536~537; Nichols v. Uni-
versal Pictures Corp., 45 F .2d 119, 122, eert. denied, . 282 
U.S. 902 [51 S.Ct. 216, 75 L.Ed. 795]; Dymow 'V. Bolton, 
11 F.2d 690, 691.) Here, to use the form of analysis employed 
in the Golding case, Weitzenkorn's idea, or ~'basic· dramatic 
core" (p. 694), is to combine certain characters in ~African 
locale . with the. myth of a fountain of eternal youth ·and, 
through the advf;lntures which befall them, . to teach a mo:ral. 
'~he moral a:ppears to be that .eternal youth is not . a blessing 
lint a curse, the only satisfactory being one full of lov;e 
and affection: However, the ''representation or expression" 
now protected by the statute. is not. this basic dramatic core, 
but is. :rather developme:q.t of both characterizations and 
adventures. 
. The next point requiring consideration concerns similarity . 
.Access being admitted by the demurrer, if. some subst~tial 
similarity between the compositions reasonably could be found, 
the .issues of similarity and qf c0pyin~ .are to be deter:rp.incd 
by the· trier of fact. · 
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In the Golding case it was said that whether the ''evidence 
is sufficient to sustain the jury's implied finding of similarity 
is a question which can only be determined upon appeal by 
reading the play and seeing the moving picture, which have 
been done by this court. 
''The parties are directly at variance as to whether this 
issue of similarity presents a question of law or of fact. The 
only direct statements in the cases appear to confirm the 
playwrights' position that it is a question of fact for the 
jury. (Citations.) However, they extend this point too far 
when they contend that the determination by the jury of this 
issue 'is conclusive' upon appeal. No finding of fact is binding 
upon an appellate court if it is not supported by substantial 
evidence. The function of this court, when the contention 
of insufficiency is made, is to examine the record to ascertain 
whether there is evidence to support the verdict of the jury. 
''. . . It is necessary to read or view the two works to 
see if they present any substantial similarity insofar as the 
plaintiff's property in his work is concerned. This is not to 
say that the appellate court will substitute itself for the jury 
to decide what it thinks of the issue of similarity; it is merely 
a question of determining if there is any substantial evidence 
of similarity to support the jury's finding." (Pp. 698-699.) 
Unquestionably, an appellate court may determine, as a 
matter of law, that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
judgment. As a corollary of this fundamental principle, 
whether there is any question to present to the trier of fact 
is, in the first instance, a question of law. And the two 
productions, the only evidence of similarity which could pos-
sibly be offered, are before the court upon the demurrer in 
accordance with the statute. 
The Stanley case recognizes the rule as to similarity applied 
in the Golding case. The court there held: ''With respect 
to the comparison between the two programs and without 
unnecessarily 'dissecting' them, there appears to be sufficient 
simi] arity to justify the finding of the jury as the 'average, 
reasonable man.' . . . We then have a question of fact-
that of the similarity between the two programs. This ques-
tion of fact was decided adversely to defendant by the jury 
whose duty it was to make the determination. The rule is 
settled that this determination will not be interfered with 
upon appeal where there is evidence to sustain it. The evi-
dence, in the form of the two programs alone, shows that there 
is substantial similarity to support the verdict." (Pp. 662-
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663.) If no similarity had appeared between the two produc-
tions, as a matter of law, the judgment entered upon the 
verdict of the jury would have been reversed. 
Having both productions before it in accordance with 
section 426 ( 3), the court may determine whether there is 
substantial similarity between them. If, as a matter of law, 
there is no such similarity, no question of fact is in issue 
and the demurrers to each count of the complaint were 
properly sustained. But if, from a comparison of the two 
productions, such similarity reasonably might be found, that 
issue, and also the question as to copying, should have been 
submitted to the jury for determination. 
[3b] In order for the third count of the complaint to state a 
cause of action for plagiarism, there must be some substantial 
similarity between the motion picture and protectible portions 
of Weitzenkorn's composition. (Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, 
Inc., supra, pp. 699, 700; Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 
snpra, 100 F.2d 533, 537-538; De Montijo v. 20th Century 
Fox: F'ilnt Corp., 40 F. Supp. 133, 138-139; Echevarria v. 
WarneT BTos. PicttM·es, 12 F. Supp. 632, 638.) A careful 
comparison of vVeitzenkorn 's composition and the motion 
picture sho\YS no similarity between them as to form and man-
ner of expression. It is true that a portion of the "basic 
dramatic core'' might be found similar. Both productions com-
bine the characters of Tarzan, Jane and Cheta in an African 
locale with the myth of a fountain of eternal youth. How-
ever, even here there is an essential difference. The com-
bination of characters, locale and myth is not utilized for 
the same purposes. If the motion picture has a moral, it is 
that eternal youth is the reward for the good, which must be 
saved from the grasp of evil forces which would corrupt it. 
In achieving their divergent goals from certain similar com-
binations of basic ingredients, the two stories are developed 
along widely different lines. This is true of characterizations, 
descriptions, and events. Because there is no similarity as to 
protectible portions of W eitzenkorn 's composition, the de-
murrer to the third count of the complaint properly was 
sustained. 
The question of protectibility need not be considered in 
determining the sufficiency of the allegations of the first count 
of the complaint, based upon express contract. As it is pleaded, 
the proof could show that Lesser and Lesser Productions agreed 
to pay for W eitzenkorn 's composition if they used it, or any 
portion of it, regardless of its originality. An "idea, if valu-
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able, may be the subject of contract. While the idea disclosed 
may be common or even open to public knowledge, yet such 
disclosure if protected by contract, is sufficient consideration 
for the promise to pay." (High v. Trade Union Courier Pub. 
Corp., 69 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529, affd. 89 N.Y.S.2d 527; Cole v. 
Lord, Inc., 262 App.Div. 116, 121 [28 N.Y.S.2d 404] ; Schon-
wald v. F. Burkart Mfg. Co., 356 Mo. 435, 448 [202 S.W.2d 
7]; Brunner v. Stix, Baer· & Fttller Co., 352 Mo. 1225, 1232 
[181 S.W.2d 643].) 
The charge of breach of contract, however, is dependent 
upon the allegation that the motion picture "is patterned upon 
and copies and uses" Weitzenkorn's composition. If, as. a 
matter of law, there is no similiarity whatsoever between the 
productions, the first count does not state a cause of action. 
However, although there is no similarity between protectible 
portions of Weitzenkorn's composition and the defendants' 
production, similarity may exist because of the combination 
of characters, locale, and myth. It is conceivable, even though 
improbable, that W eitzenkorn might be able to introduce evi-
dence tending to show that the parties entered into an express 
contract whereby Lesser and Lesser Productions agreed to 
pay for her production regardless of its protectibility and no 
matter how slight or commonplace the portion which they 
used. Such evidence, together with comparison of the pro-
ductions, would present questions of fact for the jury as to 
the terms of the contract, access, similarity, and copying. 
[lb] Under these circumstances, the facts pleaded in the first 
count are sufficient to state a cause of action and the demurrer 
to it was improperly sustained. 
[2b] The second count of the complaint alleges that Weitz-
enkorn submitted her composition to Lesser and Lesser Pro-
ductions ''at their special instance and request . . . for the 
purpose of sale to or use by defendants upon payment to plain-
tiff of the reasonable value thereof and said defendants . . . 
thereupon accepted submission of said literary and dramatic 
composition by plaintiff and retained the same and became 
fully familiar with the contents thereof." Incorporated by 
reference from the first count are the allegations of originality, 
copying, the reasonable value of the production, and the de-
fendants' refusal to pay. This is, in essence, the common 
count of quantum valebant for the reasonable value of goods 
sold and delivered. 
''This form of pleading, a common count, by long continued 
practice is not subject to attack by general demurrer or by 
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a special demurrer for uncertainty." (Auckland v. Conlin, 
203 Cal. 776, 778 [265 P. 946] ; Pike v. Zadig, 171 Cal. 273, 
276 [152 P. 923]; Abadie v. Carrillo, 32 Cal. 172, 175.) Nor 
is it subject to special demurrer on the ground of ambiguity 
or unintelligibility. (Pleasant v. Samuels, 114 Cal. 34, 38 
[45 P. 998]; see, generally, King, The Use of the Common 
Counts in California, 14 So.Cal.L.Rev. 288, 306.) Although 
an allegation of the promise to pay was essential to an action 
of assumpsit in common law pleading (Shipman, Common-Law 
Pleading, 3d ed., p. 258) it is unnecessary as a part of the 
common count under the code system of pleading. (Gregory 
v. Olabrough's Executors, 129 Cal. 475, 478 [62 P. 72]; Wil-
kins v. Stidger, 22 Cal. 231, 235 [83 Am.Dec. 64] .) 
The defendants contend that, where a demurrer is sustained 
as to a count specifically pleaded, it should also be sustained 
as to the common count based upon the same facts. Although 
it is proper under such circumstances to sustain a general 
demurrer to the entire complaint (Hays v. Temple, 23 Cal. 
App.2cl 690, 695 [73 P.2d 1248] ; Harris v. Kessler, 124 Cal. 
App. 299, 303 [12 P.2d 467]), the rule is not here applicable. 
The :first count is sufficient to state a cause of action and the 
facts relied upon in the second count are identical, with the 
exception that no express promise to pay is alleged. That the 
facts may also be substantially similar to those in the third 
count, which does not state a cause of action, will not defeat 
the common count unless it clearly appears to be based upon 
the insufficient, rather than the sufficient, specific allegations. 
Under the code system of pleading, as at common law, the 
common counts are sufficient to state a cause of action upon 
either a contract implied in fact (McClure v. Alberti, 190 Cal. 
348, 351 [212 P. 204]; Castagnino v. Balletta, 82 Cal. 250, 
257-259 [23 P. 127]) or a contract implied in law. (Stein.er 
v. Rowley, 35 Cal.2d 713, 717-718 f221 P.2d 9]; M1:n01· v. 
Baldridge, 123 Cal. 187, 190 f55 P. 783].) "It is not neceR-
:;;ary for the pleader to indicate what kind of 'implied' con-
tract, whether in fact or in law, he relies upon." (Shipman, 
Common-Law Pleading, 3d ed., p. 154.) However, the com-
mon count will not lie where the obligation of the defendant 
is something other than the payment of money. (Willett & 
Burr v. Alpert, 181 Cal. 652, 658-662 [185 P. 976]; O'Connor 
v. Dingley, 26 Cal. 11, 22-23.) Therefore, although no objec-
tion to the claim for damages· for failure to give screen credit 
was raised as a ground for demurrer to the second count, it 
should be noted that recovery, if any, upon the qu,antum 
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valebant count must be limited solely to the reasonable value 
of the composition, or portion of it, which was used. 
It is unnecessary for the pleading to distinguish between 
the contract implied in fact and the contract implied in law, 
or quasi contract, but the elements which must be proved 
for recovery upon each of them are quite different. The only 
distinction between an implied-in-fact contract and an express 
contract is that, in the former, the promise is not expressed 
in words but is implied from the promisor's conduct. (Silva 
v. Providence Hospital of Oakland, 14 Cal.2d 762, 773 [97 
P.2d 798] ; Smith v. Moynihan, 44 Cal. 53, 62; Grant v. Long, 
33 Cal.App.2d 725, 736-737 [92 P.2d 940] ; Civ. Code, §§ 1619-
1621.) Under the theory of a contract implied in fact, the 
required proof is essentially the same as under the first count 
upon express contract, with the exception that conduct from 
which the promise may be implied must be proved. (Cole 
v. Lord, Inc., supra.) Therefore, for the reasons stated in 
discussing the sufficiency of the allegations of the first count 
of the complaint, the demurrer to the second count should 
not have been sustained. 
This conclusion does not mean, however, that, upon trial, 
W eitzenkorn may be able to recover upon either the theory 
of a contract implied in fact or that of one implied in law. 
The so-called "contract implied in law" in reality is not a 
contract. (Philpott v. S1tperior Court, 1 Cal.2d 512, 520 [36 
P.2d 635, 95 A.L.R. 990]; HaU1:die v. Enginger, 175 Cal. 505, 
508 [166 P. 1].) "Quasi-contracts, unlike true contracts, are 
not based on the apparent intention of the parties to under-
take the performances in question, nor are they promises. They 
are obligations created by law for reasons of justice." (Rest., 
Contracts, § 5, com. a.) Quasi-contractual recovery is based 
upon benefit accepted or derived for which the law implies 
an obligation to pay. "Where no benefit is accepted or de-
rived there is nothing from which such contract can be im-
plied." (Rowell v. Crow, 93 Cal.App.2d 500, 503 [209 P.2d 
149].) 
The existence of a contract implied in law under a quantum 
valebant count depends upon whether the defendant "has used 
for its benefit any property of [plaintiff] ... in such man-
ner and under such circumstances that the law will impose a 
duty of compensation therefor." (Thomas v. R. J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 350 Pa. 262, 266 [38 A.2d 61]; Bowen v. Yankee 
Network, 46 F.Supp. 62, 63; Bailey v. Haberle Congress Brew-
ing Co., 193 Misc. 723, 724-725 [85 N.Y.S.2d 51] ; Alberts 
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v. Rem1:ngton Rand, Inc., 175 Misc. 486, 487 [23 N.Y.S.2d 892] ; 
Bristol v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 132 N.Y. 264, 267 [30 
N.E. 506, 28 Am.St.Rep. 568] .) The material which is used 
must constitute protectible property if recovery is to be had 
upon quasi contract (Booth Y. Stutz i1lotor· Car Co. of Amer-
ica, 56 F.2d 962, 969; Plus Promotions, Inc. v. RCA Mfg. 
Co., Inc., 49 F.Supp. 116.) Therefore, the proof necessary 
to recover upon the theory of a contract implied in law is the 
same as that required by the tort action for plagiarism. There 
is no similarity between these productions as to form and 
manner of expression, the portion which may be protectible 
property. Thus, because the defendants have used no prop-
erty belonging to W eitzenkorn, she cannot recover upon a 
quasi-contractual theory. Had that been the only cause of 
action stated by the allegations of the second count, the de-
murrer thereto properly would have been sustained. It is 
only because the common count includes also facts eharging 
an implied-in-fact contract that the demurrer should have 
been overruled. 
[3c] \V eitzenkorn complains that it was an abuse of discre-
tion for the trial court to sustain the demurrers without leave 
to amend. The conclusions whic~h haye been reached make 
it necessary to consider this contention only as to the third 
count of the complaint. The only evidence of similarity between 
the productions which can be presented is the productions 
themselves. Because there is no similarity between them as to 
protectible portions of \Veitzenkorn 's composition, no cause 
of action for plagiarism is or can be stated. Under such 
circumstances, there was no abuse of discretion in sustaining 
the demurrer to the third count without leave to amend. 
(Routh Y. Quinn, 20 Cal.2d 488, 493 [127 P.2d 1, 149, A.L.R. 
215] .) 
The judgment is affirmed as to the third cause of action and 
reversed as to the first and second causes of action with direc-
tions to permit the defendants to answer. 
Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred. 
Traynor, ,J., and Spence, J., concurred in the judgment. 
SCHAUER, J., Concurring.-For the reasons stated in my 
concurring opinion in B~lrtis v. Universal Pictures Co., Inc., 
post, p. 823 [256 P.2d 933] I concur in the judgment 
herein and also in those portions of Justice Edmonds' opinion 
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whid1 a,r·f~ not irwonsistent with the Yiews I have pa.rticnla.rl;\ 
indicated. 
CAR'l'EH, J .-I dissent. 
I disagree with the interpretation placed by the majority 
on the 194 7 amendment to section 980 of the Civil Code. 
1'hat section as it formerly read provided that '''I' he author 
of any product of the mind, whether it is an invention, or 
a composition in letters or art, or a desig·n, with or without 
delineation, or other graphical representation, has an exclu-
sive ownership therein, and in the representation or ex-
pression thereof, which continues so long as the product and 
the representations or expressions thereof made by him re-
main in his possession.'' As amended, it read (at the time 
of this action) that "The author or proprietor of any com-
position in letters or art has an exclusive ownership in the 
representation or expression thereof as against all persons 
except one who originally and independently creates the same 
or a similar composition." 'l'he majority holds that the 1947 
amendment has ''eliminated the protection formerly given to 
'any product of the mind.' The statute as it now exists, 
and as it read at the time this cause of action arose, provides 
protection only 'in the representation or expression' of a com-
position. The Legislature has abrogated the rule of protecti-
bility of an idea and California now accepts the traditional 
theory of protectible property under common law copyright.'' 
It is held that the basic dramatic core is no longer protected 
but only the "representation or expression"-the develop-
ment of both characterizations and adventures. This is the 
method by which the majority has determined that the ques-
tion of originality shall be decided. It is admitted that a "por-
tion of the 'basic dramatic core' might be found similar" in 
comparing W eitzenkorn 's composition and the motion picture 
in the instant case, but because of changes in the characteriza-
tions, descriptions and events,-what the majority calls the 
protectible interests involved-the demurrer to the third count 
(plagiarism) of the complaint was held properly sustained. 
It has been stated that the policy of the law is to promote 
the progress of literature by protecting the author against 
the plagiarist (38 C.L.R. 332), but by minor changes in the 
sequence of events and the characterizations, the plagiarist 
may escape liability under this holding that only the repre-
sentation or expression of an idea or plot is protected. This 
unnecessarily harsh result will not have the effect of promot-
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ing the progress of literature. Authors, anxious to find a mar-
ket for their work, are not in an advantageous bargaining posi-
tion to insist that the one to whom the composition is sub-
mitted sign a contract agreeing to compensate them if the 
work is used. It can be admitted that the characters Tarzan, 
Jane and Cheta are well-known, old and in the public domain 
as is the myth of the Fountain of Youth. A combination of 
those characters and the myth of the Fountain of Youth-
or the basic, central plot-could very easily be considered 
original, but this court denies protection now to the plot, 
or central idea, and says that only the expression of the 
characterizations, events and descriptions is to be protected 
under the 1947 amendment to section 980 of the Civil Code. 
'fhe movie industry is constantly looking for ''ideas'' and 
''plots'' which it develops as it sees fit. That plots are pro-
tectible, see Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 
533, 536-537; Dam v. Kirke LaSheUe, 175 F. 902, 907, 908 [99 
C.C.A. 392, 20 Ann.Cas. 1173, 41 L.R.A.N.S. 1002]; Nichols 
v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121. Even when 
a book is purchased by the industry and made into a motion 
picture, the motion picture may differ so radically from the 
book because of the change in events, characterizations, locale, 
and conclusion that one who has read the book has difficulty 
in recognizing any similarity between it and the picture. To 
extend protection only to the expression and representation 
is to give no protection at all. 
It is admitted in the majority opinion that an idea may 
be protected by an express contract, but any recovery for 
breach of that contract depends upon similarity between the 
two productions. In its statement with respect to the first 
count, based upon express contract, this court practically 
directs the trial court to direct the jury to find that Lesser 
did not promise to pay for W eitzenkorn 's production: ''It is 
1:onceivable, even thmtgh in'"probable, that W eitzenkorn might 
be able to introduce evidence tending to show that the parties 
entered into an express contract whereby Lesser and Lesser 
Productions agreed to pay for her production regardless of 
its protectibility (which is unimportant so far as this court 
is concerned) and no matter how slight or commonplace the 
portion which they used. Such evidence, together with com-
parison of the productions, would present questions of fact 
for the jury as to the terms of the contract, access, similarity, 
and copying. Under these circumstances, the facts pleaded 
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in the first count are sufficient to state a cause of action and 
the demurrer to it was improperly sustained." (Emphasis 
added.) 
No concise test has ever been laid down for determining 
the question of originality. It has been said that one requisite 
is that the work be original in the sense of being the creative 
product of the author's own effort. There is no requirement 
that the work be original in the sense of being novel, that 
is, the first of its kind in existence (Amdur, Copyright Law 
and Practice, 3, p. 69; Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris &: 
Bendien, 23 F.2d 159). It has also been said that a compo-
sition, or work, to be a subject of copyright protection, must 
be useful, and its production must have involved independent 
effort and some judgment, selection, or experience on the 
part of the author; that many works which are original in 
the sense of the law would be disdained by the critic, because 
the latter's standard of originality is based upon a different 
theory and serves a different purpose ; that to entitle a person 
to a copyright it is not necessary that he be the sole creator of 
the work for which the protection is claimed-that one who 
makes material changes, additions, improvements, notes, com-
ments, or a substantially new adaptation or arrangement of 
an old piece of music, or an abridgment, translation, dramatiza-
tion, digest, index or concordance of a work is entitled to a 
copyright for his results (Ball, The Law of Copyright and 
Literary Property, 111, pp. 237-241). "Although original 
plots (dramatic situations) were exhausted centuries ago, 
original and novel ideas for handling old plots seem inexhaust-
ible, and as long as sufficient originality in treatment or 
handling of the old plot appears the law endeavors to afford 
protection" (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Schauer, Stan-
ley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 35 Cal.2d 653, 668-669 
[221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216]). Where, as here, plaintiff 
has combined old elements in a new way, the question of 
originality should have been submitted to the jury. I do 
not agree that the 194 7 amendment to section 980 of the Civil 
Code has circumscribed the protection of the law to merely 
the form and manner of expression of a literary composition. 
Insofar as the issue of similarity is concerned, I am of 
the opinion that the test is still that impression received by 
the average reasonable man upon a comparative reading of 
the two productions and that if reasonable minds could differ 
as to whether or not the two were similar, the question is 
one of fact and should be submitted to the jury. 
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Because it is my belief that the majority opinion interprets 
the 1947 amendment to section 980 of the Civil Code so nar~ 
rowly as to provide no protection whatever to the products 
of an author's creative mind and because there is inherent 
therein too strict a test for determining the issue of similarity 
between the two productions, I would reverse the entire judg-
ment with directions to the trial court to overrule the de-
murrers and permit the defendants to answer if they be so 
advised. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 28, 
1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22094. In Bank. ,Apr. 29, 1953.] 
ARTHUR KURLAN, Appellant, v. COLUMBIA BROAD-
CASTING SYSTEM, INC., (a Corporation) et al., Re-
spondents. 
[la, lb] Literary Property-Pleading.-A count of a complaint 
which alleges that plaintiff submitted his radio program to 
defendants at their special instance and request pursuant to 
an express oral agreement that, if they used all or any part 
of the program, they would pay him its reasonable value, and 
that defendants accepted submission of the program script 
and recording, became fully familiar with it, and thereafter, 
without plaintiff's authority or license, produced and broadcast 
over a coast-to-coast network a weekly series of programs 
which substantially copied, used and embodied his radio pro-
gram and format to his damage, states a cause of action, and 
a judgment for defendants entered on an order sustaining 
their demurrers without leave to amend will be reversed with 
directions to permit defendants to answer. 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Pleading.-A count of a complaint which alleges 
that plaintiff submitted his radio program idea and sam-
ple audition recording to defendants at their request for 
the purpose of sale to or use by them on payment to him 
of its reasonable value, and that thereafter they, without plain-
tiff's license or authority, broadcast a weekly series of pro-
grams which substantially copied and used his radio program 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Literary Property; Am.Jur., Literary Property 
and Copyright, § 112. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-4] Literary Property. 
